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Abstract
Introduction During the 2003 severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) crisis, we proposed and tested a new
protocol for cardiac arrest in a patient with SARS. The protocol
was rapidly and effectively instituted by teamwork training using
high-fidelity simulation.
Methods Phase 1 was a curriculum design of a SARS-specific
cardiac arrest protocol in three steps: planning the new
protocol, repeated simulations of this protocol in a classroom,
and a subsequent simulation of a cardiac arrest on a hospital
ward. Phase 2 was the training of 275 healthcare workers
(HCWs) using the new protocol. Training involved a seminar,
practice in wearing the mandatory personal protection system
(PPS), and cardiac arrest simulations with subsequent
debriefing.
Results Simulation provided insights that had not been
considered in earlier phases of development. For example, a
single person can don a PPS worn for the SARS patient in 1 1/
2 minutes. However, when multiple members of a cardiac arrest
team were dressing simultaneously, the time to don the PPS
increased to between 3 1/2 and 5 1/2 minutes. Errors in
infection control as well as in medical management of advanced
cardiac life support (ACLS) were corrected.
Conclusion During the SARS crisis, real-time use of a high-
fidelity simulator allowed the training of 275 HCWs in 2 weeks,
with debriefing and error management. HCWs were required to
manage the SARS cardiac arrest wearing unfamiliar equipment
and following a modified ACLS protocol. The insight gained
from this experience will be valuable for future infectious disease
challenges in critical care.
Introduction
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a newly identi-
fied atypical pneumonia that can be life threatening. Attention
was drawn to the disease in February 2003 when a physician
and subsequently 12 other hotel guests staying in a hotel in
Hong Kong became ill [1]. One of these hotel guests returned
to Toronto, Canada, died on 5 March 2003, and became the
index case for Toronto. The Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report published a description of the SARS outbreak on 21
March 2003 [2]. The SARS virus seemed to be highly conta-
gious in the hospital setting. A case report suggested that intu-
bation of patients produced a high risk for transmission of
SARS to healthcare workers (HCWs) [3].
SARS created a crisis in healthcare in Toronto. The lack of lit-
erature, uncertainty about treatment, and fear of the disease
caused great concern among HCWs. In late April 2003, our
Critical Care Department was asked to urgently develop and
implement a protocol for the management of cardiac arrest in
the SARS patients. At the time there were directives from the
Ontario provincial government mandating the use of a per-
sonal protection system (PPS) during the intubation of SARS
patients [4]. A PPS was defined as 'an apparatus consisting of
head, face and neck protection with or without enclosed body
protection'. An example of a PPS cited in the directive was the
Stryker T4 system (Stryker®  Instruments, Kalamazoo, MI,
USA).
ACLS = advanced cardiac life support; CBS = Code Blue Special; HCW = healthcare worker; ICU = intensive care unit; PPS = personal protection 
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The cardiac arrest scenario was of great concern because
care had to be delivered immediately. We knew from previous
simulation experience that a HCW required 1 1/2 minutes to
dress in the Stryker T4 [5]. Hence, application of a PPS would
increase the time before resuscitation could begin. We
needed to develop a protocol that ensured HCW safety as
well as timely patient care.
We used simulation to perfect the protocol as well as to train
the cardiac arrest team. Simulation has been used to improve
individual and team performances [6-9]. It has also been used
as an evaluative tool [10,11]. We used the simulated cardiac
arrest scenarios to provide an opportunity for deliberate prac-
tice, an important concept in effective learning [12]. The
rationale for this approach was that simulation improved the
retention of advanced cardiac life support (ACLS) guidelines
in comparison with textbook review [13].
Materials and methods
Simulation was used to design a protocol and then to train
over a two-week period all HCWs who might be involved in a
SARS cardiac arrest.
Phase 1: Cardiac arrest protocol
A modified ACLS protocol was designed and referred to as
'Code Blue Special' (CBS). We were aware that there was
minimal scientific evidence, and there were no guidelines, for
decisions related to having HCWs apply protective equipment
that would delay time to definitive ACLS care. The Critical
Care Department convened committee meetings involving
experts representing the disciplines involved in the treatment
of cardiac arrest (anesthesia, cardiology, critical care, emer-
gency medicine, nursing, and respiratory therapy). The infec-
tion control service provided consultants to the committee. An
initial protocol was developed by this committee.
A group of educators then assessed this protocol in a teach-
ing area by repeated simulations. The infection control service
monitored the simulations for breaches of infection control.
After these simulations, discussions between educators and
infection control personnel resulted in a modified protocol that
was accepted by the multidisciplinary committee (Figure 1).
During these simulations we recognized the need for a SARS-
specific equipment cart.
Finally, the group of educators conducted a cardiac arrest sim-
ulation with a manikin (Laerdal™, SimMan) placed in a bed in
an empty negative-pressure patient room on a ward. In prepa-
ration, all necessary equipment to manage a SARS cardiac
arrest was placed outside the room and all HCWs that would
respond to an actual SARS cardiac arrest (nurses, physicians
and respiratory therapists) were present. A full arrest scenario
was then simulated, including the transport of the resuscitated
patient to the intensive care unit (ICU). During this simulation
an educator and the director of infection control noted any
flaws. Phase 1, the protocol development, took 4 days to
complete.
Phase 2: Team training program
The goal of Phase 2 was to train the on-call cardiac arrest
teams in CBS. We acquired a dedicated training area in the
hospital consisting of five adjoining rooms with computer and
Internet access. We obtained call schedules for the arrest
teams and began the training with the team members who
were on call during the next two days.
Using our experience in Phase 1, we decided to train HCWs
in groups of eight. We planned to train HCWs in the use of the
PPS in groups of two, and because four educators were avail-
able daily we decided that the maximum number of HCWs for
each session was eight.
A two-hour training session proceeded as follows:
1. All HCWs attended a PowerPoint presentation highlighting
pertinent principles for the care of the SARS cardiac arrest
patient. Each received a handout and had time for questions
and answers. We stressed all the modifications to the
Figure 1
Summary of algorithm for cardiac arrest protocol (Code Blue Special)  for a SARS patient Summary of algorithm for cardiac arrest protocol (Code Blue Special) 
for a SARS patient.Available online http://ccforum.com/content/10/1/R3
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standard ACLS protocol, especially relating to defibrillation,
airway management and infection control.
2. The group then observed two educators describing and
demonstrating the dress-up and the dress-down method for
the PPS.
3. Next, the group was divided into two sets of four who went
into separate rooms. Here individualized practice sessions
were done with the trainees donning and then removing the
PPS (Figure 2). A 2:1 ratio of trainees to supervising educa-
tors was used.
4. Last, we simulated cardiac arrest scenarios. Four trainees
managed one unknown ACLS scenario (asystole, pulseless
electrical activity, pulseless ventricular tachycardia, and ven-
tricular fibrillation). We timed how long it took the first person
to don the PPS. The other four trainees observed.
5. After the simulation we debriefed the entire group and dis-
cussed and reinforced pertinent points. Then the four remain-
ing HCWs managed a different simulation. The groups were
chosen to mimic the arrest team, namely an anesthesia resi-
dent, ICU nurse, medical resident and respiratory therapist.
6. All physicians trained with their peers concurrently on call.
There were six anesthesia residents and six medical residents,
but many more nurses and respiratory therapists, to be trained.
Hence, once we had trained the residents, we modified the
simulation for the remaining nurses and respiratory therapists.
Subsequent simulations involved only basic cardiopulmonary
resuscitation and intubation because hospital policy mandates
defibrillation by physicians only.
Results
Cardiac arrest protocol
Time to don the PPS
The first protocol required a PPS for everyone entering the
patient's room as part of the arrest team. This was based on
the assumption that it would take 1 1/2 minutes to don the
PPS and this was felt to be an acceptable delay before provid-
ing patient care.
During Phase 1 we found that dressing took longer. When four
members of the arrest team were simultaneously dressing it
took between 3 1/2 and 5 1/2 minutes for the fastest team
member to dress, even with assistants aiding verbally and
physically. This longer time seemed to be due to HCWs and
assistants talking at the same time to request equipment, and
HCWs reaching across each other for equipment.
With the assistance of the logistics department we developed
a cart for the PPS. The cart was easily portable and allowed
four HCWs to access it simultaneously; it also had numbered
equipment labels allowing HCWs to follow the dress-up pro-
cedure visually without memorizing the steps.
To expedite dressing we put up wall posters demonstrating
the dress-up procedure and we used one dressing assistant
per two team members. This represented a realistic number of
people probably available to help at an actual arrest. It was
also an acceptable total number of people (six) that could fit
around the equipment cart.
Time to defibrillation
Once we discovered that the time to don the PPS in a team
situation was at least 3 1/2 minutes, there was concern about
the delay to defibrillation. After discussion with infection con-
trol and reviewing the available literature, we determined that
there was no evidence that the person defibrillating needed to
don a PPS. We therefore changed the protocol so that any
physician on the ward could defibrillate, even if not part of the
arrest team. This physician was required to wear routine pro-
tective SARS gear: an N95 respirator, goggles, a gown and
two pairs of gloves. The N95 respirator is a face mask that fil-
ters 95% of particles greater than 0.3 µm in diameter. Respi-
rator is the terminology used by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (USA) and the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health.
Figure 2
Healthcare worker dressed in T4 Stryker personal protection system  (PPS) Healthcare worker dressed in T4 Stryker personal protection system 
(PPS). The PPS is worn over a disposable gown. In addition, goggles, 
an N95 respirator and two pairs of gloves are worn.Critical Care    Vol 10 No 1    Abrahamson et al.
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We also proposed having all SARS patients on cardiac telem-
etry, so that a defibrillator could be brought into the room by
the first responder. Available resources did not permit a defi-
brillator in each room.
Technique of defibrillation
Although a PPS was not worn for defibrillation, we noted that
if instead of applying paddles, multifunction defibrillation elec-
trodes capable of both pacing and defibrillation (M3501A;
Agilent Technologies, Andover, MA, USA) were applied to the
chest, hands-off defibrillation could be accomplished. The
defibrillator machine could be placed about 2 m from the
patient when multifunction electrodes were used, and the but-
tons on the machine could be pressed for defibrillation. There
was uncertainty about the mode of transmission of the SARS
virus, but 1 m is approximately the distance that organisms
travel by droplet spread [14]. We recommended that, on
wards with SARS patients, all defibrillators have this multifunc-
tion capability.
Ergonomic factors
A problem we encountered previously with the PPS was the
risk of dislodging the PPS helmet when a stethoscope was
placed in the ears [5]. To minimize stethoscope use, we used
a portable end-tidal CO2 detector as the initial method to con-
firm tracheobronchial placement of the endotracheal tube. If
the end-tidal CO2 was felt to be unreliable owing to low car-
diac output we allowed a second person to place the stetho-
scope earpieces under direct vision. We did not use an
esophageal detector device because of infection concerns
with applying negative pressure to the airway of a SARS
patient.
We also noted ergonomic limitations when wearing the PPS
such as the following: claustrophobia; an inability to balance
when removing equipment, which increased the risk of self
contamination; the need to perform shorter periods of cardiop-
ulmonary resuscitation to avoid heat fatigue; and the need to
have an easy-to-follow poster of degowning placed on the wall
to avoid making errors during the degowning process.
ACLS modifications
Positive-pressure ventilation was permitted only by HCWs
wearing the PPS. To minimize the exposure of HCWs to the
SARS virus, patients received a neuromuscular blocker before
intubation. In situ intravenous access was added to the proto-
col to expedite drug delivery. No drugs were permitted via the
endotracheal tube.
Exiting the patient room
During Phase 1 we noted that once the arrest team dressed in
the PPS entered the room and began resuscitation, the initial
HCWs in the room without a PPS were at risk. HCWs without
a PPS were therefore instructed to position themselves at
least 2 m from the patient during positive-pressure airway
manipulation.
Infection control skills
During the simulations it became apparent that many seem-
ingly simple actions during removal of the PPS were more
complicated than expected and had been inadequately
described. An example was the difficulty in removing the con-
taminated outer pair of gloves without contaminating the clean
inner pair of gloves. Most instructions merely instruct one to
'remove the gloves'. The education and infection control team
simulated every step of the dressing and undressing to ensure
safety and clarity, and then scripted and photographed the
process.
Composition of SARS cardiac arrest team and the number 
of HCWs to train
The usual cardiac arrest team at the time had ward nurses
assisting the arrest team. This was changed during Phase 1
because it would have required training too many ward nurses
in the application of the required PPS. Instead, ward nurses
were trained as dressing assistants.
Negative pressure rooms
When the cardiac arrest was simulated in a negative-pressure
room on the ward, we noted that there were items in the room
that could not be disinfected, such as cork bulletin boards.
Subsequently, we went to every negative-pressure room in the
hospital to ensure infection control safety.
Lack of transport policy
During the planning for the simulation on the ward, we realized
that the CBS protocol lacked a scripted transport policy for
moving the resuscitated patient from the ward to the ICU. This
policy was immediately developed in conjunction with the
infection control, housekeeping and security services.
Team training program
We trained 275 HCWs over a two-week period. Training ses-
sions were held on Monday to Friday. All physicians were suc-
cessfully trained in teams that mirrored their on-call schedule.
The largest group to train was the 225 ICU nurses. It was dif-
ficult to free eight nurses for two hours because of concurrent
patient care obligations and because we could not run ses-
sions during ICU breaks. We ran three sessions during the day
shift (07:30 to 19:30) and one session during the evening shift
(20:00 to 22:00).
Evaluation
The program was evaluated by the trainees. They were asked
to complete an evaluation form at the end of each session. The
results are summarized in Table 1. These forms were reviewed
by the educators daily to review any concerns raised by the
trainees.Available online http://ccforum.com/content/10/1/R3
Page 5 of 6
(page number not for citation purposes)
During each session the educators checked both individual
and team performances of the trainees in the cardiac arrest
protocol, as well as the infection control policy.
We noted and corrected common ACLS deficiencies, for
example an inability to attach the multifunction pacing/defibril-
lation electrodes to the defibrillator machine, or an inability to
adjust the transcutaneous pacemaker settings such as the
pacemaker output.
Mistakes in infection control practice by HCWs were noted
and corrected. Common errors noted were the inability to
remove the contaminated outer pair of gloves without contam-
inating the clean inner pair of gloves, the inability to remove the
gown without contaminating the uniform underneath, the fail-
ure to disinfect hands appropriately, and not administering
neuromuscular blocking agents before intubation.
The theme that needed constant attention was that removing
the PPS always posed a great danger of self-contamination.
Trainees were required to repeat the PPS removal until no
errors in technique were noted. There were no known
instances of self-contamination of HCWs in our institution. The
effect on bedside practice was difficult to evaluate properly
because only one cardiac arrest actually occurred in a patient
suspected of having SARS.
Discussion
We describe the use of high-fidelity simulation to design a
modified practice of cardiac arrest resuscitation for an 'at risk
of contamination' situation and to train caregivers as individu-
als and as a team. Simulation was used to delineate flaws and
omissions in a modified ACLS protocol. We used scenario-
based simulation training as an educational tool for different
cardiac arrest etiologies. In all, 275 HCWs were trained in this
SARS-specific cardiac arrest protocol.
One unexpected but crucial result was that the time to don the
PPS was prolonged for a group (3 1/2 to 5 1/2 minutes) in
comparison with a single HCW (1 1/2 minutes) donning the
same equipment. This observation resulted in a major change
to the initial protocol, namely not requiring the wearing of a
PPS for defibrillation. A PPS was mandatory for any positive-
pressure airway manipulation. We designed the protocol to
minimize HCW contact with airway secretions.
We were concerned with the possibility of human error in this
scenario, especially because of the reported transmission of
SARS to protected HCWs involved in the intubation of a
SARS patient [3].
We had to repeatedly reinforce our observation that although
applying the PPS correctly was important, it was the undress-
ing and removal of contaminated clothing that was even more
important to prevent self-contamination. Undressing had to be
done without the use of the dressing assistant, while wearing
multiple layers of protective equipment. When simulation
occurred in a negative-pressure patient room instead of the
teaching area, we discovered unexpected infection control
problems with furniture as well as our lack of a scripted trans-
port protocol to move the patient to the ICU.
Some limitations of our approach became apparent and may
help in planning for future disasters. Specific logistical chal-
lenges noted during our training period included the following:
1. The need for educators to have dedicated time freed from
their regular duties.
2. The need for a high ratio of educators to trainees, to ensure
careful observation of newly learned infection control
practices.
3. The need for night training sessions for staff who work only
night shifts.
4. The limited time in a crisis situation to simulate multiple
scenarios.
5. The ongoing need for resources such as a dedicated train-
ing area, supplies and assistants.
6. The difficulty of quickly freeing up HCWs to train when they
also have patient care obligations.
Because of the urgent nature of the crisis and time restraints
we were unable to make a full evaluation of the effectiveness
of our training. We evaluated only satisfaction with the pro-
gram content, namely level one of the four levels of evaluation
according to Kirkpatrick's model [15]. Although we consid-
ered evaluations before and after teaching, the limited time
available to HCWs to attend the teaching sessions precluded
this. We cannot validate the efficacy of our teaching because
only one cardiac arrest occurred in the hospital in a patient
suspected to have SARS.
Table 1
Results of evaluation of training session for Code Blue Special
Question Rating
123 4 5
1. Was the session comprehensive 
enough?
12 91 0 0
2. Was the duration of the session 
appropriate?
48 4 9
3. Were the teaching methods 
effective?
10 54
Question 1 was asked of all participants; questions 2 and 3 were 
added later. Scale: 1 = absolutely no, 5 = absolutely yes.Critical Care    Vol 10 No 1    Abrahamson et al.
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The cost of the training program was substantial, although we
do not have exact totals. This would include time for the dedi-
cated educators, costs for educational materials and costs of
the non-reusable equipment. In addition we needed two
assistants. One was responsible for bookings, providing hand-
outs, keeping sign-in records and collating evaluations. A sec-
ond assistant was required to restock disposable equipment
(for example gloves, gowns and masks) and to clean the
rooms between sessions. Finally this project monopolized the
high-fidelity simulator, excluding its use by others.
Planning can improve crisis management for future disasters.
High-fidelity simulations of infectious disease protocols can be
an invaluable asset for staff and patient safety. A written proto-
col can be developed and simulated, and core groups of peo-
ple can be trained in the protocol before the crisis occurs.
Once the crisis occurs, some HCWs should be immediately
transferred from their usual duties to manage the patients. The
other previously trained HCWs would immediately begin
arranging training sessions in a pre-identified training area.
Conclusion
High-fidelity simulation proved to be a crucial tool in the evalu-
ation and implementation of a new, urgently developed SARS-
specific cardiac arrest protocol, as well as in the subsequent
training of team members in the use of unfamiliar protective
equipment. It was used to detect and correct flaws and omis-
sions in a theoretical protocol specific to the SARS patient.
We used scenario-based simulation training to prepare our
HCWs to manage a cardiac arrest in a SARS patient.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors' contributions
SDA and SC were the lead educators in developing the car-
diac arrest protocol and in arranging and delivering the simu-
lation-based training. SDA was the lead writer of the article.
SC reviewed the article. FB was involved in helping to develop
the cardiac arrest protocol and was involved in the proof read-
ing of the article. All authors read and approved the final
manuscript.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the advice and encouragement 
of Dr Arthur Slutsky in the development of the manuscript. The authors 
also thank Dr Andrew Baker, Dr Robert Byrick, Mr Paul Doherty, Dr 
David McKnight and Dr Arthur Slutsky for their expert assistance in 
reviewing the manuscript.
References
1. Poutanen SM, Low DE, Henry B, Finkelstein S, Rose D, Green K,
Tellier R, Draker R, Adachi D, Ayers M, et al.: Identification of
severe acute respiratory syndrome in Canada.  N Engl J Med
2003, 348:1995-2005.
2. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC): Outbreak of
severe acute respiratory syndrome – worldwide, 2003.  MMWR
Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2003, 52:226-228.
3. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC): Cluster of
severe acute respiratory syndrome cases among protected
health-care workers – Toronto, Canada, April 2003.  MMWR
Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2003, 52:433-436.
4. Directives To All Ontario Acute Care Hospitals for High-Risk
Procedures involving SARS Patients Critical Care Areas
[http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/providers/program/pub
health/sars/docs/new_normal/dir_high_risk_procedures.pdf]
5. Working Group on Adjunctive Protective Equipment for High-
Risk Procedures in SARS patients   [http://sars.medtau.org/
adjunctreport.doc]
6. Chopra V, Gesink BJ, de Jong J, Bovill JG, Spierdijk J, Brand R:
Does training on an anaesthesia simulator lead to improve-
ment in performance?  Br J Anaesth 1994, 73:293-297.
7. Holcomb JB, Dumire RD, Crommett JW, Stamateris CE, Fagert
MA, Cleveland JA, Dorlac GR, Dorlac WC, Bonar JP, Hira K, et al.:
Evaluation of trauma team performance using an advanced
human patient simulator for resuscitation training.  J Trauma
2002, 52:1078-1086.
8. Howard SK, Gaba DM, Fish KJ, Yang G, Sarnquist FH: Anesthe-
sia crisis resource management training: teaching anesthesi-
ologists to handle critical incidents.  Aviat Space Environ Med
1992, 63:763-770.
9. Larbuisson R, Pendeville P, Nyssen AS, Janssens M, Mayne A:
Use of Anaesthesia Simulator: initial impressions of its use in
two Belgian University Centers.  Acta Anaesthesiol Belg 1999,
50:87-93.
10. Schwid HA, Rooke GA, Carline J, Steadman RH, Murray WB,
Olympio M, Tarver S, Steckner K, Wetstone S, Anesthesia Simula-
tor Research Consortium: Evaluation of anesthesia residents
using mannequin-based simulation: a multiinstitutional study.
Anesthesiology 2002, 97:1434-1444.
11. Morgan PJ, Cleave-Hogg D: Evaluation of medical students'
performance using the anaesthesia simulator.  Med Educ
2000, 34:42-45.
12. Ericsson KA, Krampe RT, Tesch-Romer C: The role of deliberate
practice in the acquisition of expert performance.  Psychol Rev
1993, 100:363-406.
13. Schwid HA, Rooke GA, Ross BK, Sivarajan M: Use of a compu-
terized advanced cardiac life support simulator improves
retention of advanced cardiac life support guidelines better
than a textbook review.  Crit Care Med 1999, 27:821-824.
14. Garner JS: Guideline for isolation precautions in hospitals. The
Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee.
Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 1996, 17:53-80.
15. Boyle MA, Crosby RK: Academic program evaluation: lessons
learned from business and industry.  J Ind Teach Educ 1997,
3:81-85.
Key messages
•  We found that simulation was a valuable tool for evalu-
ating a new treatment protocol in a novel and rapidly 
evolving crisis.
•  We found that scenario-based simulation training was 
effective, but resource intense.
•  We found that simulation was suited to teamwork train-
ing for disaster management.
•  We suggest that simulation be used to prepare precise 
protocols for future serious events.
•  We recommend that for uncommon events, simulation 
be done both in the teaching area and the actual patient 
environment.